Iran’s War Is a Religious War Against the Jews and the Infidel West

Iran's apocalypticism shapes Its foreign policy and military actions

COMMENTARY

By David W. Virtue, DD
March 25, 2026

The war against Iran is not merely a regional effort to eliminate a powerful regime. It is deeply rooted in an apocalyptic ideological framework—particularly the belief in Mahdism (Islamic Messianism)—which significantly shapes Iran’s foreign policy and military actions.

No U.S. president has fully grasped this reality. Not Bush, Obama, Biden, or Trump—though the conflict Trump recently initiated is being interpreted by some Christians as bearing apocalyptic overtones that parallel Iran’s own eschatological expectations.

The Core Belief: The Return of the Mahdi

At the heart of the Islamic Republic’s worldview lies the Twelver (Ithna Ashari) Shia doctrine of Mahdaviat: the belief that the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, entered occultation in the ninth century and will return at the end of time to establish global justice. This is not a vague spiritual hope; it is a political program embedded in the structure of the regime.

Under the principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), established by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, the Supreme Leader serves as the Mahdi’s deputy until his return. The state—and particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—functions not merely as a governing body but as an instrument to actively prepare the ground for this event: exporting revolution, resisting perceived enemies, and building an “Islamic civilization.”

Iranian leaders frequently express a commitment to creating conditions for the Mahdi’s return, which includes the destruction of perceived enemies—particularly Israel (”the Zionist entity” or “Little Satan”) and the United States (”the Great Satan”). The mantra “Death to Israel, Death to America” is not rhetorical flourish; it is theological imperative.

And Iranian Shi’ites mean it. No matter their economy or politics or their own lives. That’s why any negotiation that assumes we can tempt them with money, power, or survival will fail. They don’t care about any of these things.

In fact, they are happy to die to bring on the Mahdi. They will be martyrs.

Martyrdom, Suffering, and Strategic Calculus

This apocalyptic narrative permeates Iran’s political institutions and military strategy. For the regime, martyrdom is the highest calling. As Msgr. Dr. Michael Nazir-Ali, President of the Oxford Centre for Training, Research, Advocacy & Dialogue, observes:

“The history of the various Shia sects was often one of persecution, exile, and death at the hands of whichever group happened to be dominant at the time. This has evolved into an entrenched understanding of the virtue of suffering for their beliefs—a perspective not found in more triumphalist versions of Islam.

“This theology of suffering has been strategically mobilized. Every act of repression under the Shah, every setback since the Revolution, has been framed within the context of the martyrdom of the early Imams. The Iran-Iraq War demonstrated that mass martyrdom was not seen as defeat but as acceleration of the Mahdi’s return.

“Consequently, Iran’s creation and strengthening of proxies across Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Gaza is not merely an exercise in realpolitik. It is an eschatological project: establishing God’s rule to hasten the Mahdi’s arrival. Even the 2007 release of British sailors during Eastertide was explained by Iranian officials as acknowledgment of Jesus’s ascension—since, in Shia eschatology, Jesus (Isa) will return to pray behind the Mahdi and help establish divine justice.”

Implications for Diplomacy and Deterrence

This ideological framework nullifies conventional diplomatic approaches. Traditional ceasefires and negotiations falter because they cannot account for a regime whose long-term objectives are eschatological, not merely political. When leaders believe that suffering and martyrdom hasten divine justice, deterrence based on cost-benefit analysis loses its leverage.

Religious minorities bear the brunt of this worldview. Bahá’ís, Farsi-speaking evangelical Christians, and members of Iran’s ancient Jewish community have faced imprisonment, exclusion, property confiscation, and extrajudicial killing—often branded as “enemies” for their faith or foreign ties.

The recent killing of an estimated 70,000 Iranian citizens protesting the regime’s rule underscores the stakes. Yet the critical question remains: Does the average Iranian citizen share the apocalyptic convictions of the ayatollahs and the IRGC? Or even if they don’t, will their pride in Persian sovereignty prevent them from accepting regime change brought by outsiders?

Strategic Scenarios: Regime Survival or Collapse

Western policymakers must integrate this “martyr complex” and nationalism into their political and military calculations. Two scenarios merit careful planning:

If the regime survives, its endurance will be interpreted as divine vindication. The doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih will be reinforced, justifying further repression and the denial of basic freedoms. The IRGC and Basij will see their sacrifices affirmed, emboldening their theocratic agenda.

If the regime falls—whether through aerial campaign or ground intervention—the revolutionaries have a ready-made infrastructure for indefinite resistance. Withdrawal to mountains and deserts, exile, and guerrilla warfare will be framed not as defeat but as participation in the Imams’ suffering and a means to hasten the Mahdi’s return.

As Nazir-Ali warns, post-conflict planning must begin now, not later. Iraq demonstrated the catastrophic costs of unpreparedness. If military action leads to regime change, then preventing the Basij and allied elements from waging protracted insurgency—whether from within Iran or abroad—must be a priority. Simultaneously, supporting civil society structures and new institutions is essential.

Hope exists. Many Iranians—students, women, minorities, academics, and even segments of the bazaar—seek cooperation in building a new Iran. Any successful transition must be rooted in Iran’s ancient civilization, drawing on its rich heritage for the urgent task of reconstruction.

A Note on Comparative Eschatology

While this commentary focuses on Iran’s Shia eschatology, it is worth briefly contrasting it with Jewish messianic expectations, given the regime’s explicit focus on Israel:

• Orthodox Judaism affirms belief in a human Messiah from the Davidic line, consistent with Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles of Faith.

• Conservative Judaism retains traditional liturgical references but often emphasizes a Messianic Era of redemption over a personal redeemer.

• Reform Judaism generally concurs with the Conservative perspective, focusing on ethical progress toward a messianic age rather than a supernatural figure.

These distinctions matter: Iran’s leadership frames its conflict with Israel in apocalyptic, theological terms—not merely geopolitical ones and certainly not economic ones. Prosperity is not the goal of true believers. Understanding this difference is crucial for accurate strategic assessment.

Conclusion: Beyond Simplistic Interpretations

This conflict is not simply about oil, regional dominance, or even nuclear capability—though all are factors. At its core, it is driven by an ideological framework in which suffering, resistance, and martyrdom are virtues that accelerate divine justice.

As Nazir-Ali notes, if the West fails to account for this psychology, its strategies will misfire. Trump and his senior staff—or any leadership confronting this reality—must prepare not only for military engagement but for the ideological dimensions of the conflict. Victory requires more than battlefield success; it demands a nuanced understanding of the adversary’s deepest convictions.

We shall see.